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Psychological models can only help improve intergroup relations if they accurately 
characterise the mechanisms underlying social biases. The claim that outgroups 
suffer dehumanization is near ubiquitous in the social sciences. We challenge the 
most prominent psychological model of dehumanization - infrahumanization theory - 
which holds outgroup members are subtly dehumanized by being denied human 
emotions. We examine the theory across seven intergroup contexts in thirteen pre-
registered and highly powered experiments (N=1,690).  We find outgroup members 
are not denied uniquely human emotions relative to ingroup members. Rather, they 
are ascribed prosocial emotions to a lesser extent but antisocial emotions to a 
greater extent. Apparent evidence for infrahumanization is better explained by 
ingroup preference, outgroup derogation and stereotyping. Infrahumanization theory 
may obscure more than it reveals about intergroup bias. 
 






1. Introduction 1 
The claim that outgroup members are perceived as ‘less than human’ has been 2 
extremely influential in social psychology, social neuroscience, philosophy and 3 
sociology. It has entered into public rhetoric as well, regularly being discussed in the 4 
media. Blatant forms of dehumanization are thought to reveal themselves in 5 
propaganda and other forms of hate speech in which outgroup members are 6 
described as less than human creatures, for example as similar to rats, parasites or 7 
vermin (Haslam, 2006; Smith, 2011). Blatant dehumanization has been linked to 8 
extreme intergroup harm such as genocide, torture and police brutality towards 9 
African Americans (Goff et al., 2008, 2014; Smith, 2011; Tirrell, 2012).  10 
Subtler forms of dehumanization, in which outgroups are considered 11 
somewhat less human, are hypothesised to be widespread and are typically studied 12 
in lab-based settings (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000, 13 
2001). In subtle forms of dehumanization, outgroup members are thought to 14 
possess uniquely human qualities to a lesser extent than do the ingroup.  Three 15 
psychological models of subtle dehumanization have been particularly prominent.  16 
According to Harris & Fiske (2006), to the extent outgroups are dehumanized, they 17 
are thought to possess mental states to a lesser extent than do the ingroup. 18 
According to the dual model, outgroups are thought to possess uniquely human 19 
character traits to a lesser extent than do the ingroup (Haslam, 2006). According to 20 
infrahumanization theory, perhaps the most prominent of the three models, 21 
outgroups are thought to possess uniquely human emotions to a lesser extent than 22 
do the ingroup (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001).  These subtle forms of dehumanization 23 




towards outgroups (Cuddy et al., 2007; Vaes et al., 2003). In a world of social 25 
division, with frequently occurring cases of discrimination based on religion, ethnicity 26 
and gender, to name only a few, understanding the extent and consequences of 27 
dehumanization is crucial. 28 
In recent years, several theoretical critiques of research on dehumanization 29 
have emerged (Appiah, 2008; Bloom, 2017; Lang, 2010, 2020; Manne, 2016, 2018; 30 
Over, 2020a, 2020b; Rai et al., 2017; Smith, 2014, 2020). These critiques suggest 31 
that perceiving outgroups as ‘less than human’ might be less common than it first 32 
appears. Considering blatant dehumanization, as evidenced by historical examples 33 
of propaganda, Manne (2016) and Bloom (2017) have both pointed out that victims 34 
said to be ‘dehumanized’ are often described with terms that only really make sense 35 
when applied to humans, albeit negative and antisocial ones. For example, in Nazi 36 
propaganda, Jewish people were frequently described as ruthless, corrupt, 37 
treacherous and criminally minded, terms out of place when used to describe an 38 
animal or a machine. Relatedly, the hypothesised causal connection between 39 
dehumanization and intergroup harm has been questioned. Several theorists 40 
suggest that being perceived as having certain human qualities, such as being 41 
corrupt, spiteful or deceptive, may actually increase people’s risk of harm (Appiah, 42 
2008; Bloom, 2017; Lang, 2010, 2020; Manne, 2016, 2018; Over, 2020a, 2020b). 43 
Empirical research showing that morally-motivated intergroup harm is not linked to 44 
dehumanization lends support to these critiques (Rai et al., 2017).  45 
 Turning to lab-based research, Over (2020a, 2020b) argues that what 46 
appears to be evidence for dehumanization, as operationalised by the dual model 47 




better explained in terms of intergroup preference effects (a general tendency to 49 
prefer the ingroup to the outgroup). According to the dual model of dehumanization, 50 
outgroup members tend to be attributed uniquely human character traits to a lesser 51 
extent than are the ingroup (Haslam, 2006). However, to date, the overwhelming 52 
majority of the traits included in empirical research are socially desirable, for 53 
example, warmth, rationality, civility and refinement. Over (2020a; 2020b) 54 
hypothesises that while outgroup members may be thought to possess some 55 
uniquely human qualities to a lesser extent, for example, civility, refinement and 56 
rationality, there may be other uniquely human qualities that are more strongly 57 
attributed to the outgroup than the ingroup. For example, antisocial human 58 
characteristics such as jealousy, arrogance and bitterness seem to only make sense 59 
in the context of humans but are unlikely to be attributed more strongly to ingroup 60 
than outgroup members.  61 
Recent experimental work from Enock and colleagues (2021) supports 62 
Over’s critique, presenting an empirical challenge to the dual model of 63 
dehumanization (Haslam, 2006).  Enock et al. (2021) first established that people 64 
tend to associate undesirable characteristics as well as desirable ones with humans, 65 
confirming an omission from the dual model. Subsequently, seven experiments 66 
tested the predictions of the dual model directly against a social preference account 67 
in three distinct intergroup contexts - political opponents, immigrants and criminals. 68 
Results showed no evidence for dehumanization when undesirable as well as 69 
desirable human traits were included in the stimuli. Rather, in line with the social 70 
preference account, desirable traits were ascribed more strongly to ingroup 71 




members than ingroup members, irrespective of perceived humanness (Enock et 73 
al., 2021).  74 
Perhaps the most prominent psychological model of dehumanization is 75 
infrahumanization theory (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001). This theory is distinct from the 76 
dual model in that it proposes outgroup members are denied uniquely human 77 
emotions rather than character traits. The model is founded on the widespread 78 
notion that there is a distinction between secondary emotions (such as pride and 79 
guilt) and primary emotions (such as happiness and anger). The former are 80 
considered unique to humans, the latter shared with other animals (Demoulin et al., 81 
2004; Ekman, 1992; Leyens et al., 2000). Seminal work has found that when 82 
choosing emotions to best describe different groups, people preferentially ascribe 83 
uniquely human emotions more strongly to ingroup members (Leyens et al., 2001). 84 
For example, across a range of social contexts, participants ascribed uniquely 85 
human emotions such as hope, compassion, pride, melancholy, disappointment and 86 
remorse, to ingroup members to a greater extent than to outgroup members (Banton 87 
et al., 2020; Cortes et al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Prati et 88 
al., 2016) 89 
Infrahumanization research has proliferated in recent years (Leyens, 2009; 90 
Vaes et al., 2012). Effects have been reported across explicit and implicit measures 91 
(Boccato et al., 2007; Paladino et al., 2002), and a multitude of intergroup contexts, 92 
including regional, religious and racial identities (Banton et al., 2020; Rodríguez-93 
Pérez et al., 2011), university affiliations (Vaes et al., 2003) and minimal groups 94 
(Demoulin et al., 2009; Simon & Gutsell, 2020). The importance of the model is 95 




to improve intergroup relations (Brown et al., 2007; Capozza et al., 2013; Prati et al., 97 
2016; Tam et al., 2007). 98 
 Of key importance to infrahumanization theory is the claim that subtle 99 
dehumanization is distinct from intergroup preference because participants ascribe 100 
both positive (e.g., hope, admiration) and negative (e.g., guilt, remorse) uniquely 101 
human emotions more strongly to the ingroup than the outgroup (Leyens et al., 102 
2000, 2001). That the effect is observed for negative human emotions is claimed to 103 
be crucial for separating infrahumanization from intergroup preference. According to 104 
infrahumanization theory, the process of perceiving others as lacking negative 105 
human emotions shows a subtle form of dehumanization that is separate from 106 
derogation because here, ‘humanness’ is different from ‘good’ (Castano & Giner-107 
Sorolla, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016). As Leyens 108 
and colleagues (2000, p.189) note in their original hypotheses:  109 
 People should more easily associate their ingroup than an outgroup with 110 
 secondary emotions. This preferential association should be true 111 
 independent of the valence of the secondary emotions. Indeed, it is the 112 
 category of secondary emotions as such that is considered typically human. 113 
 No qualification is made for positive or negative secondary emotions.  114 
Explaining this further, Leyens and colleagues (2001, p. 398) argue:  115 
 If the attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup reflected a mere 116 
 positivity effect, it would lose its interest and originality… would people also 117 
 select more negative secondary emotions for their ingroup than for the 118 
 outgroup? A positive answer… would get rid of a simple positivity bias in the 119 




 In their original studies, Leyens et al. (2001) included valence 121 
(positive/negative) as a factor in their analysis. They found that more secondary 122 
emotions were attributed to the ingroup than the outgroup and that this effect was 123 
not qualified by the valence of the emotions (see Leyens et al., 2001, p. 402, Fig. 2). 124 
Subsequent work from Cortes and colleagues (2005) demonstrated similar effects, 125 
showing more positive (e.g., contentment, delight) and negative (e.g., melancholy, 126 
resignation) uniquely human emotions to be ascribed to the ingroup than the 127 
outgroup, again not qualified by emotion valence (see Cortes et al., 2005, p. 247, 128 
Figure 1). Convergent evidence is provided by research that treats and valence and 129 
humanness as continuous factors (Castano & Gina-Sorolla, 2006) and by research 130 
that has measured the attribution of positive (e.g., amazement, compassion) and 131 
negative (e.g., despair, guilt) emotions in separate experiments (Paladino et al., 132 
2002).  133 
Owing to the inclusion of negative as well as positive emotions in 134 
infrahumanization research, the theory thus appears to be immune to Over’s 135 
(2020a; 2020b) critique. However, we reconsider infrahumanization theory through a 136 
framework that understands emotions as social as well as individual experiences 137 
(Parkinson, 1996). Some emotions are by definition positive to experience but are 138 
somewhat unkind to others (e.g., schadenfreude), while some may be negative to 139 
experience but are not inherently unkind to others (e.g., disappointment). We 140 
suggest that although emotions such as guilt and remorse are negative to 141 
experience, they are not necessarily antisocial in character. Rather, they indicate 142 
appropriate responses to moral wrong-doing and thus people who display them are 143 




phenomenon raises the conceptual distinction between valence (positive or negative 145 
to experience) and sociality (prosocial or antisocial as viewed by others).  146 
 To our knowledge, no work has yet measured whether previously reported 147 
infrahumanization effects are independent of emotion sociality. Terms frequently 148 
included as exemplars of negative uniquely human emotions in infrahumanization 149 
work such as melancholy, guilt and remorse, may be negative to experience, but are 150 
not obviously antisocial. This omission makes it impossible to determine whether 151 
infrahumanization really is separable from ingroup preference and thus whether it 152 
holds unique explanatory value in intergroup relations. 153 
 Twenty years since infrahumanization theory was proposed, we revisit and 154 
test its founding claims in thirteen pre-registered, highly powered experiments. In 155 
our first six experiments (Study 1) we show that previously reported 156 
infrahumanization effects broadly replicate across multiple intergroup contexts. In 157 
six subsequent experiments (Study 2), we remove the confound in previous 158 
research by introducing emotions that differ in sociality rather than valence.  In line 159 
with the social preference account, we show that apparent evidence for 160 
infrahumanization is better explained by ingroup preference and stereotyping. In a 161 
final experiment (Study 3), we provide further evidence for the social preference 162 
account by replicating the pattern of results observed in Study 2 in a minimal group 163 
design.  164 
 In Studies 1 and 2, we use the same six intergroup contexts. The precise 165 
social conditions necessary for infrahumanization have not been clearly established 166 
within the field and it has been noted that it may not always occur (e.g., Castano & 167 




prior empirical evidence suggests that outgroups are particularly likely to be 169 
infrahumanized if they threaten one’s worldview, are disliked, and belong to a social 170 
category that one would not want to belong to (Leyens, 2009). Initial 171 
infrahumanization studies included students from the Canary Islands versus those 172 
from mainland Spain as the intergroup context (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001). The 173 
researchers noted general hostility between these groups, with each seeing the 174 
other as a ‘disliked’ outgroup, suggesting ‘outgroup derogation’ was likely (Leyens et 175 
al., 2001, pp. 396–399). Follow-up work included Spanish or Belgian ingroup 176 
members and North African individuals as outgroup members, at the time a ‘very 177 
stigmatized minority and low-status group in Belgium and in the Canary Islands’ 178 
(Paladino et al., 2002, p. 113). Most infrahumanization studies focus on social 179 
contexts that are similarly grounded in antagonism (e.g., Banton et al., 2020; Gaunt, 180 
2009).  181 
We chose our groups to maximise our chances of replicating 182 
infrahumanization effects if they occur (Leyens, 2009). The first outgroup we chose 183 
was Muslims (Christian ingroup) (Expts. 1a&2a). Dehumanization of religious 184 
outgroups, including of Muslims by Christians, has been widely reported (Banton et 185 
al., 2020; Kteily et al., 2016; Viki et al., 2013) and discrimination against Muslims is 186 
a pressing social problem in many Western societies (Calfano, 2018; Hewstone & 187 
Schmid, 2014). The remaining outgroups were criminals (Expts. 1b&2b), child 188 
molesters (Expts. 1c&2c), anti-vaxxers (Expts. 1d&2d), people who do not adhere to 189 
social distancing regulations during the Covid-19 pandemic (‘non-social distancers’) 190 
(Expts. 1e&2e), and climate change deniers (Expts. 1f&2f). Prior work reports 191 




2012). We introduced the three additional outgroup contexts (anti-vaxxers, non-193 
social distancers and climate change deniers) based on current pertinence. At the 194 
time of data collection in early April 2020, the UK had been in full ‘lockdown’ for just 195 
over one week and tension between individuals who did and did not adhere to the 196 
guidelines was developing (Prosser et al., 2020). Similarly, social division between 197 
those who are pro- and anti-vaccination has been particularly salient during the 198 
COVID-19 pandemic (Johnson et al., 2020). Rather than seeking to be exhaustive, 199 
the intergroup contexts we chose for Studies 1 and 2 illustrate the conceptual 200 
distinction between infrahumanization theory and our alternative social preference 201 
account. In Study 3, we replicated our results in a minimal group design. This 202 
allowed us to further demonstrate the generalisability of our results in a social 203 
context free from prior stereotypes and intergroup antagonism.  204 
 205 
2. Data collection and availability   206 
All experiments reported in this manuscript took place online and were created and 207 
administered using Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com). Participants were recruited 208 
through Prolific (https://www.prolific.co) and a different sample was included for 209 
each experiment reported. Informed consent was obtained at the start of each 210 
session according to approved ethical procedures. Participants were compensated 211 
at an approximate rate of £7.50 per hour. All studies were pre-registered and the 212 
data is available open access. Links to pre-registration documents and raw data for 213 






3. Pretest  217 
One concern with prior work is that there are inconsistencies in how emotions are 218 
categorised; whether or not items are considered uniquely human changes between 219 
studies. For example, ‘enjoyment’ is considered uniquely human whereas ‘joy’ is not 220 
(Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002). ‘Happiness’ is sometimes considered 221 
uniquely human (Paladino et al., 2002) but sometimes not (Cortes et al., 2005). 222 
These problems may arise because previous studies have not rigorously pretested 223 
the emotion terms they used as stimuli as well as from translational discrepancies 224 
across studies conducted in different languages. In order to formally determine 225 
which emotions (In English) tend to be considered uniquely human and which tend 226 
to be considered shared with other animals, we conducted a pretest in which we 227 
asked participants to rate fifty-four common emotion terms on three scales: human 228 
uniqueness, valence of experience and sociality.  229 
3.1. Pretest Methods 230 
3.1.1. Participants 231 
Sixty participants completed the ratings (22 female, 37 male, 1 ‘other’), aged 232 
between 18 and 54 (Mean age=26.8, SD=7.98). All participants were fluent in 233 
English. Eight people failed one or more attention checks and their data was 234 
excluded and replaced.  235 
3.1.2. Scales  236 
We chose fifty-four common emotion terms and asked participants to rate them on 237 
Humanness (the extent to which it is believed each emotion is experienced by 238 
humans compared to other species), Valence (the extent to which it is believed each 239 




believed each emotion is prosocial or antisocial), using three separate sliding 241 
scales. The full list of emotion terms, along with additional information about scale 242 
presentation, is in supplementary information.   243 
3.1.3. Procedure 244 
Participants were informed that the study would examine the ways in which people 245 
understand emotional terms and that they would be asked to rate emotion words on 246 
the three separate scales. Once informed consent was obtained, brief demographic 247 
and screening questions were asked. Then, participants were taken through the 248 
three question blocks. Participants were debriefed and redirected back to Prolific for 249 
payment. The session took approximately twelve minutes.  250 
3.2. Pretest results and discussion 251 
Our pretest confirmed that emotions differ both in valence and sociality. We present 252 
the mean ratings for each emotion on Humanness, Valence and Sociality in 253 
supplementary information, Table S1. The ‘basic’ (or ‘primary’) emotions such as 254 
fear, sadness, happiness and surprise featured among the emotions most thought 255 
of as shared with other species (Ekman, 1992). In line with infrahumanization 256 
theory, we largely replicated prior work from Demoulin et al. (2004), who also 257 
reported emotions such as nostalgia and optimism to be most uniquely human, and 258 
emotions such as fear and surprise to be least uniquely human. Importantly, 259 
however, none of the terms commonly included as negative secondary emotions in 260 
previous research, such as guilt, remorse, resignation and melancholy (Leyens et 261 
al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002) were perceived to be antisocial, even though they 262 




 Overall, there was a general positive association between mean scores 264 
across participants for valence and sociality. This suggests that, across a broad 265 
range of emotion terms, emotions that make us feel positive are also viewed as 266 
prosocial and emotions that make us feel negative may be viewed as more 267 
antisocial. However, for the specific negative emotions commonly included in prior 268 
infrahumanization work, participants’ scores on valence and sociality scales were 269 
not strongly (if at all) associated. For example, correlations were r(58) = .131, p = 270 
.318 for regret, r(58) = .187, p = .153 for melancholy, r(58) = .262, p = .035 for 271 
disillusion, and  r(58) = .060, p = .651 for remorse. This shows that the kinds of 272 
negative emotions that infrahumanization researchers have included in previous 273 
research (e.g., regret, melancholy, disillusion, remorse - Banton et al., 2020; Leyens 274 
et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes et al., 2003) may be negative to experience 275 
but are not antisocial and so are not best placed to determine whether 276 
infrahumanization is separate from intergroup preference. This provides strong 277 
grounds for re-examining the nature of intergroup bias in emotion attribution.  278 
 279 
4. Study 1: Replicating previous research  280 
In our first six experiments we sought to replicate previous research. Participants 281 
rated how strongly they believed ingroup and outgroup members to experience 282 
sixteen emotions. Four emotions were unique to humans and positive (nostalgia, 283 
optimism, humility, hope), four were unique to humans and negative, (disillusion, 284 
regret, melancholy, remorse) four were shared with other animals and positive,  285 
(happiness, tenderness, surprise, love) and four were shared with other animals and 286 
negative (fear, loneliness, sadness, nervousness).  287 




4.1.1. Participants  289 
A power analysis using MorePower 6.0.4 found a minimum N of 126 to be 290 
necessary to detect interactions with a medium effect size (partial eta squared .06) 291 
with an alpha of .05 and power of .8. 130 different participants completed the ratings 292 
in each experiment. Participants were only eligible if they were 18 or over, fluent in 293 
English and had not taken part in any of the other experiments reported. Data 294 
collection for each experiment took place completely separately. We excluded and 295 
replaced any participants that failed one or more of the attention checks. 296 
 In Experiment 1a (Muslim outgroup), participants could only take part if they 297 
identified as Christian. Seven people failed one or more attention check. Of the final 298 
sample, 95 participants were female and 35 were male, aged from 18 to 68 (Mean 299 
age = 35.3, SD = 14.07).  300 
 In Experiment 1b (criminal outgroup), participants could only take part if they 301 
had not served previous prison sentences. Five people failed one or more attention 302 
check. Of the final sample, 58 participants were female, 70 were male, 1 was 303 
nonbinary and 1 indicated ‘prefer not to say’. Ages ranged from 18 to 59 (Mean age 304 
= 27.1, SD = 7.94).  305 
 In Experiment 1c (child molester outgroup), four people failed one or more 306 
attention check. Of the final sample, 84 participants were female, 46 were male, and 307 
ages ranged from 18 to 57 (Mean age = 28.5, SD = 10.66).  308 
 In Experiment 1d (anti-vaxxer outgroup), participants could only take part if 309 
they were pro vaccination. Four people failed one or more attention check and three 310 




Of the final sample, 53 participants were female, 75 were male and 2 were non-312 
binary/agender, aged from 18 to 60 (Mean age = 27.0, SD = 8.92).  313 
 In Experiment 1e (non-social distancer outgroup), participants could only 314 
take part if they were living in the UK and reported that they were following current 315 
social distancing regulations. Three people were excluded because they indicated 316 
that they were not adhering to social distancing regulations and their data was 317 
excluded and replaced. Of the final sample, 95 participants were female and 35 318 
were male, aged from 18 to 68 (Mean age = 35.3, SD = 14.07). 319 
 In Experiment 1f (climate change deniers as outgroup), participants could 320 
only take part if they believed in climate change. Five people failed one or more 321 
attention check. Of the final sample, 52 participants were female, 78 were male and 322 
ages ranged from 18 to 62 (Mean age = 26.6, SD = 9.22). 323 
4.1.2. Stimuli development 324 
We chose emotions from our pretest data (supplementary information, Table S1) 325 
that best fit the four emotion categories of interest: unique to humans and positive, 326 
unique to humans and negative, shared with other animals and positive and shared 327 
with other animals and negative. Table 1 shows the list of emotion words included in 328 
the final stimulus sets. From the most and least uniquely human terms, we chose 329 
four rated as highly positive and four rated as highly negative. In developing the 330 
items for our emotion categories, we ensured that humanness ratings were closely 331 
matched between the positive and negative conditions for each level of humanness 332 
so that we could accurately separate valence effects from ones of humanness. See 333 





Table 1. Emotion terms included for each condition in all experiments 336 
Study 1 Study 2 
Positive  Negative Prosocial Antisocial 
Unique to humans Nostalgia Disillusion Nostalgia Arrogance  
Optimism Regret Optimism Schadenfreude 
Humility Melancholy Humility Contempt  
Hope Remorse Hope Scorn 
Shared with other animals  Happiness Fear Happiness Hostility  
Tenderness Loneliness Tenderness Irritation  
Surprise Sadness Love Anger  
Love Nervousness Friendliness Disgust  
 337 
4.1.3. Scales  338 
Participants indicated on unmarked sliders how strongly they thought the ingroup 339 
and outgroup in each experiment experienced the sixteen emotions from Not at all 340 
(0) to Very strongly (100), with the midpoint Somewhat (50). For example, in 341 
Experiment 1b, the outgroup block began ‘In the following questions, please 342 
consider the group: Individuals with criminal convictions’. Then, participants 343 
would respond to each item, such as ‘How strongly do you think a typical criminal 344 
feels nostalgia’. Ingroup and outgroup items were presented in two separate blocks 345 
shown on sequential screens, the order of which was counterbalanced across 346 
participants. The sixteen emotion items within each block were randomised and one 347 
attention check per block was also included approximately halfway through, such as 348 
‘Please indicate Somewhat’. 349 
 Participants also completed the blatant dehumanization scale (Kteily et al., 350 
2015) (Figure 1) and a simple preference measure for both groups. In the blatant 351 
dehumanization scale, participants saw the ‘ascent of man’ image and were asked 352 




member of each group to be, with 0 corresponding to the very bottom and 100 to the 354 
most human at the very top. In the attitude scale, participants were asked to indicate 355 
how they felt about each group using an unmarked sliding scale from Extremely 356 
Negative (0) to Extremely Positive (100). For all scales, half of the participants 357 
responded to ingroup items first and half to outgroup items first. 358 
 We included the group preference and blatant dehumanization measures to 359 
check that our chosen groups were the kinds that we should expect to see 360 
infrahumanized should the process occur. Prior work shows that infrahumanization 361 
measures correlate positively with blatant dehumanization scores (Kteily et al., 362 
2015). Thus, though they are not claimed to measure the same construct, they have 363 
been shown to reliably co-occur. We included the attitude measure as confirmation 364 
that the outgroups were social categories that participants ‘would not like or want to 365 
belong to’ (Leyens, 2009), also increasing chances of detecting infrahumanization if 366 
it occurs.   367 
4.1.4. Procedure  368 
Participants were informed that the study was designed to help us understand the 369 
ways in which people ascribe emotions to different groups of individuals and stated 370 
the particular groups of interest for each experiment. Participants were instructed 371 
that they would be asked to rate sixteen emotion words on two scales, one for each 372 
social category, and then complete two scales asking about attitudes to each group. 373 
Once informed consent was obtained, brief demographic and screening (if relevant) 374 
questions were asked. Then, participants were taken through the two experimental 375 




blatant dehumanization scales. Lastly, participants were debriefed and redirected 377 
back to Prolific for payment. On average, the sessions took under ten minutes.   378 
4.1.5. Design and data analysis 379 
In line with our pre-registered analysis plan, we conducted 2 (Group: 380 
ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (Valence: positive/negative) x 2 (Humanness: unique to 381 
humans / shared with other animals) within subjects ANOVAs to test for 382 
infrahumanization in intergroup emotion attributions. Scores for each emotion 383 
category were obtained by calculating the mean of the four emotion terms within the 384 
category for each participant. For example, a participant’s score for uniquely human 385 
positive emotion ascriptions towards the ingroup would be the mean of their ratings 386 
on Nostalgia, Optimism, Humility and Hope within the ingroup block. More detail 387 
about the design is available in supplementary information.  388 
 In this design, infrahumanization would be observed in an interaction 389 
whereby uniquely human emotions are more strongly ascribed to the ingroup, 390 
independent of valence (Leyens et al., 2000). This should not be the case for 391 
emotions shared with other animals, for which previous work found the reverse or 392 
no difference (Leyens et al., 2001). For example, in original experiments 393 
demonstrating infrahumanization, Leyens and colleagues (2001) showed that more 394 
positive and negative uniquely human emotions were attributed to the ingroup than 395 
the outgroup and that this was not qualified by an interaction with valence (see 396 
Leyens et al., 2001, p. 402, Fig. 2).  397 
 Though previous studies do not find interactions between intergroup emotion 398 
attributions and valence, there tend to be main effects of valence such that 399 




results are not central to the predictions of infrahumanization theory nor the social 401 
preference account.   402 
 In following up significant interactions, we report only comparisons between 403 
ingroup and outgroup ratings for each condition, in line with testing the main 404 
hypotheses. We measured differences in ratings for ingroup and outgroup on the 405 
attitude and ‘blatant dehumanization’ scales using paired-samples t-tests. All tests 406 
were two-sided and met the assumptions necessary for our statistical approaches. 407 
4.2. Study 1 Results  408 
4.2.1. Blatant dehumanization and attitude scores  409 
In every experiment, the outgroup was rated as significantly less human than the 410 
ingroup on the blatant dehumanization scale (all ps<.001). Additionally, participants 411 
reported feeling significantly more negative towards the outgroup than the ingroup 412 
on the attitude scale (all ps<.001). Figure 1 shows the points at which outgroups and 413 
ingroups were marked on the blatant dehumanization scale. The extent to which 414 
outgroups were ‘blatantly dehumanized’ varied greatly across our intergroup 415 
contexts. The average point at which Muslims and ‘criminals’ were marked fell 416 
between the most ‘evolved’ looking human silhouette and the more caveman-like 417 
silhouette next to it on the scale. ‘Child molesters’ and ‘non-social distancers’ were 418 
rated much further down on the ascent scale, nearer to the midway point between 419 
the ape-like and modern human-like depictions.  Figure S1 (supplementary 420 
information) shows mean results for each ingroup and outgroup on the 421 





Figure 1. The average points at which outgroups and ingroups were marked 424 
on the blatant dehumanization scale across Studies 1, 2 and 3. All outgroups 425 
were significantly dehumanized relative to the corresponding ingroup (all ps<.001 in 426 
Studies 1 &2, p = .002 in Study 3).  427 
 428 
4.2.2. Intergroup emotion ascriptions 429 
4.2.2.1. Experiment 1a 430 
For ratings towards Muslims (outgroup) and Christians (ingroup), there were 431 
significant main effects of group, F(1, 129) = 32.54, p <.001, ηp²= .201, and of 432 
valence, F(1, 129) = 101.80, p <.001, ηp²= .441, with ratings higher overall for 433 
ingroup than outgroup and for positive than negative emotions. There was no 434 
significant main effect of humanness, F(1, 129) = .76, p =.384, ηp²= .006.  435 
 There were significant interactions between group and humanness, F(1, 129) 436 
= 11.89, p =.001, ηp²= .084, group and valence, F(1, 129) = 17.16, p <.001, ηp²= 437 
.117, and humanness and valence, F(1, 129) = 11.77, p =.001, ηp²= .084. Pairwise 438 




both for uniquely human emotions (p<.001) and for emotions shared with other 440 
animals (p = .001). Ratings were overall higher for ingroup than outgroup for positive 441 
emotions (p<.001), but there were no differences between groups for negative 442 
emotions (p = .463).  443 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 129) = 444 
11.37, p =.001, ηp²= .081. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher for 445 
ingroup than outgroup for positive uniquely human terms (p < .001), negative 446 
uniquely human terms (p =.006), and positive terms shared with other animals (p 447 
<.001). However, there was no difference between ingroup and outgroup for 448 
negative terms shared with other animals (p = .104).   449 
4.2.2.2. Experiment 1b 450 
For ratings towards Criminals (outgroup) and ‘individuals with no criminal history’ 451 
(ingroup), there were significant main effects of group, F(1, 129) = 31.84, p <.001, 452 
ηp²= .198, valence, F(1, 129) = 4.64, p =.033, ηp²= .035, and humanness, F(1, 129) 453 
= 35.86, p <.001, ηp²= .218. Ratings were higher overall for ingroup than outgroup, 454 
for negative than positive emotions, and for emotions shared with other animals 455 
than for uniquely human emotions.  456 
 There were significant interactions between group and humanness, F(1, 129) 457 
= 7.62, p =.007, ηp²= .056, group and valence, F(1, 129) = 167.70, p <.001, ηp²= 458 
.565, and humanness and valence, F(1, 129) = 4.16, p =.043, ηp²= .031. Pairwise 459 
comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup 460 
both for uniquely human emotions and for emotions shared with other animals (ps < 461 
.001). Ratings were overall higher for ingroup than outgroup for positive emotions 462 




 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 129) = 464 
4.56, p =.035, ηp²= .034. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher for 465 
ingroup than outgroup for positive terms, both uniquely human and shared with 466 
other animals (ps < .001), but higher for outgroup than ingroup on negative terms, 467 
both uniquely human (p = .007) and shared with other animals (p = .020).  468 
4.2.2.3. Experiment 1c 469 
For ratings towards ‘child molesters’ (outgroup) and ‘individuals with no criminal 470 
history’ (ingroup), there were significant main effects of group, F(1, 129) = 154.31, p 471 
<.001, ηp²= .545, and of humanness, F(1, 129) = 83.51, p <.001, ηp²= .393, but not 472 
of valence, F(1, 129) = 2.97, p =.087, ηp²= .023. Ratings were higher overall for 473 
ingroup than outgroup and for emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely 474 
human emotions.  475 
 There were significant interactions between group and humanness, F(1, 129) 476 
= 17.70, p <.001, ηp²= .121, group and valence, F(1, 129) = 119.32, p <.001, ηp²= 477 
.481, and humanness and valence, F(1, 129) = 28.98, p <.001, ηp²= .189. Pairwise 478 
comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup 479 
both for uniquely human emotions and for emotions shared with other animals (ps < 480 
.001). Ratings were also overall higher for ingroup than outgroup for positive 481 
emotions (p<.001), and for negative emotions (p = .001).  482 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 129) = 483 
14.10, p <.001, ηp²= .099. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher for 484 
ingroup than outgroup for positive uniquely human terms (p < .001), negative 485 




<.001). However, there was no difference between ingroup and outgroup for 487 
negative terms shared with other animals (p = .287).   488 
4.2.2.4. Experiment 1d 489 
For ratings towards ‘anti-vaxxers’ (outgroup) and ‘pro-vaxxers’ (ingroup), there were 490 
significant main effects of humanness, F(1, 129) = 40.42, p <.001, ηp²= .239, and of 491 
valence, F(1, 129) = 69.59, p <.001, ηp²= .350, but not of group, F(1, 129) = 1.02, p 492 
=.315, ηp²= .008. Ratings were higher overall emotions shared with other animals 493 
than for uniquely human emotions and for positive than negative emotions.  494 
 There were significant interactions between Group and Valence, F(1, 129) = 495 
88.99, p <.001, ηp²= .408, Group and Humanness, F(1, 129) = 11.49, p =.001, ηp²= 496 
.082, and Valence and Humanness, F(1, 129) = 8.41, p =.004, ηp²= .061. Pairwise 497 
comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup for 498 
uniquely human emotions (p = .017) but not for emotions shared with other animals 499 
(p < .358). Ratings were overall higher for ingroup than outgroup for positive 500 
emotions (p<.001) but higher for outgroup than ingroup for negative emotions (p = 501 
.001). The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 129) = .31, p =.580, ηp²= 502 
.002.  503 
4.2.2.5. Experiment 1e 504 
For ratings towards ‘non-social distancers’ (outgroup) and ‘social distancers’ 505 
(ingroup), there were significant main effects of group, F(1, 129) = 239.50, p <.001, 506 
ηp²= .650, and of humanness, F(1, 129) = 60.13, p <.001, ηp²= .318, but not of 507 
valence, F(1, 129) = 1.75, p =.188, ηp²= .013. Ratings were higher overall for 508 
ingroup than outgroup and for emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely 509 




 There were significant interactions between group and humanness, F(1, 129) 511 
= 38.46, p <.001, ηp²= .230, group and valence, F(1, 129) = 16.08, p <.001, ηp²= 512 
.111, and humanness and valence, F(1, 129) = 113.12, p <.001, ηp²= .467. Pairwise 513 
comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup 514 
both for uniquely human emotions and for emotions shared with other animals (ps < 515 
.001). Ratings were also overall higher for ingroup than outgroup for positive 516 
emotions (p<.001), and for negative emotions (p = .001).  517 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 129) = 518 
149.18, p <.001, ηp²= .536. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher 519 
for ingroup than outgroup for all four emotion conditions - positive uniquely human 520 
terms, negative uniquely human terms, positive terms shared with other animals and 521 
negative terms shared with other animals (all ps <.001).   522 
4.2.2.6. Experiment 1f 523 
For ‘climate change deniers’ (outgroup) and ‘climate change believers’ (ingroup), 524 
there were significant main effects of group, F(1, 129) = 171.51, p <.001, ηp²= .571, 525 
and of humanness, F(1, 129) = 27.79, p <.001, ηp²= .177, but not of valence, F(1, 526 
129) = .85, p =.359, ηp²= .007. Ratings were higher overall for ingroup than outgroup 527 
and for emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely human emotions.  528 
 There were significant interactions between group and humanness, F(1, 129) 529 
= 3.92, p =.05, ηp²= .029, group and valence, F(1, 129) = 38.99, p <.001, ηp²= .232, 530 
and humanness and valence, F(1, 129) = 17.02, p <.001, ηp²= .117. Pairwise 531 
comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup 532 
both for uniquely human emotions and for emotions shared with other animals (ps < 533 




emotions and for negative emotions (ps = .001). The three-way interaction was not 535 
significant, F(1, 129) = .13, p =.724, ηp²= .001.  536 
 Mean scores (M) and standard errors of the mean (SE) for each of the 537 
conditions across all experiments in Study 1 are shown in supplementary 538 
information, Table S2. Figure 2 shows results from Study 1.  539 
 540 
Figure 2. Partial replications of infrahumanization theory. Some outgroups 541 
(Muslims, child molesters, non-social distancers and climate change deniers) were 542 
rated overall as experiencing both positive and negative uniquely human emotions 543 
to a lesser extent than the ingroup (top panels). These outgroups were also rated as 544 
experiencing some emotions shared with other animals to a lesser extent than the 545 
ingroup (bottom panels). Note that while main effects of valence have been reported 546 
in some prior work (see Leyens et al., 2001, p. 402, Fig. 2), we do not plot these the 547 
prediction, as they are not relevant for distinguishing between the theories. Error 548 
bars represent standard errors.  549 
4.3. Study 1 Discussion  550 
Results partially replicated the predictions of infrahumanization theory - some 551 




human emotions to a lesser extent than the ingroup. However, these outgroups 553 
were also rated as experiencing emotions shared with other animals to a lesser 554 
extent than the ingroup. In each experiment, the outgroup was rated as ‘less human’ 555 
on the blatant dehumanization scale, confirming that these were the types of 556 
intergroup contexts in which we ought to see infrahumanization effects should the 557 
process occur. We next examined whether controlling for the sociality of emotional 558 
terms explained apparent evidence for infrahumanization.   559 
 560 
5. Study 2: Testing the social preference account  561 
In our next six experiments, we test whether what appears to be infrahumanization 562 
may be explained by ingroup preference and stereotyping. Rather than comparing 563 
intergroup ascriptions of emotions that varied by how positive or negative they are to 564 
experience, we compared ascriptions of emotions than varied by how prosocial or 565 
antisocial they are in character. Participants rated the same six groups on four types 566 
of emotional experience: unique to humans and prosocial (nostalgia, optimism, 567 
humility, hope), unique to humans and antisocial (arrogance, schadenfreude, 568 
contempt, scorn), shared with other animals and prosocial (happiness, tenderness, 569 
love, friendliness) and shared with other animals and antisocial (hostility, irritation, 570 
anger, disgust).  571 
This design pits the predictions of infrahumanization against a social 572 
preference account. Infrahumanization would be observed in an interaction between 573 
Group and Humanness such that uniquely human emotions will be more strongly 574 
ascribed to ingroup than outgroup, both for prosocial and antisocial emotions (i.e., 575 




emotions will typically be attributed more strongly to the ingroup and antisocial ones 577 
to the outgroup, regardless of humanness (Figure 3 shows both predictions).  578 
5.1. Study 2 Methods  579 
5.1.1. Participants  580 
Based on the same power analysis as reported for Study 1, 130 different 581 
participants completed the ratings in each experiment. The same eligibility criteria 582 
were applied as for Study 1.   583 
 For Experiment 2a (Muslim outgroup), participants could only take part if 584 
they identified as Christian. Six people failed one or more attention check. Of the 585 
final sample, 86 participants were female, 42 male and 2 were non-binary/agender, 586 
aged from 18 to 71 (Mean age = 33.6, SD = 11.79).  587 
 For Experiment 2b (criminal outgroup), participants could only take part if 588 
they had not served previous prison sentences. One person failed one or more 589 
attention check. Of the final sample, 62 participants were female, 68 were male and 590 
ages ranged from 18 to 65 (Mean age = 26.9, SD = 8.65).  591 
 For Experiment 2c (child molester outgroup), three people failed one or 592 
more attention check. Of the final sample, 87 were female, 42 male and 1 non-593 
binary, with an age range of 18 to 61 (Mean age = 31.6, SD = 10.14).  594 
 In Experiment 2d (anti-vaxxer outgroup), participants could only take part if 595 
they were pro-vaccination. Seven people failed one or more attention check and four 596 
additional people were excluded because they indicated that they were anti 597 
vaccination. Of the final sample, 50 were female and 80 were male, aged from 18 to 598 




 In Experiment 2e (non-social distancers outgroup), participants could only 600 
take part if they were living in the UK and following social distancing regulations. 601 
Data was excluded and replaced for three participants who failed one or more 602 
attention check and one additional participant who indicated that they were not 603 
adhering to social distancing regulations. Of the final sample, 86 were female, 42 604 
were male and 2 were non-binary/agender, aged from 18 to 71 (Mean age = 33.6, 605 
SD = 11.79). 606 
 For Experiment 2f (climate change deniers outgroup), participants could only 607 
take part if they believed in climate change.  Two people failed one or more attention 608 
check.  Of the final sample, 53 were female, 76 male and 1 non-binary, with an age 609 
range of 18 to 60 (Mean age = 27.3, SD = 8.36).  610 
5.1.2. Stimuli development  611 
We chose emotions from our pretest data (supplementary information, Table S1) 612 
that best fit the four emotion categories of interest: unique to humans and prosocial, 613 
unique to humans and antisocial, shared with other animals and prosocial and 614 
shared with other animals and antisocial. From the most and least uniquely human 615 
terms, we chose four rated as highly prosocial and four rated as highly antisocial, 616 
this time ignoring valence ratings. Table 1 shows the full list of emotion words. We 617 
chose the emotions such that humanness ratings were closely matched between 618 
the prosocial and antisocial conditions at each level of humanness. This was so that 619 
dimensions of Sociality and Humanness were orthogonal, allowing us to accurately 620 
separate effects of each. See supplementary information for further details on stimuli 621 
development.  622 




We employed the same six intergroup contexts as for Study 1. Apart from including 624 
different emotion items, the emotion attribution scales were identical as to those 625 
described for Study 1.  Participants again completed the blatant dehumanization 626 
scale (Kteily et al., 2015) (Figure 1) and the group preference scale for the ingroup 627 
and outgroup in each experiment.  628 
5.1.4. Procedure, design and data analysis    629 
The procedure was the same as outlined for Study 1. The design and data analysis 630 
were almost identical as described for Study 1 though with the Sociality 631 
(prosocial/antisocial) variable instead of the Valence (positive/negative) variable.   632 
5.2. Study 2 Results  633 
5.2.1. Blatant dehumanization and attitude scores  634 
The outgroup was always rated as significantly less human than the ingroup on the 635 
blatant dehumanization scale (all ps<.001). Additionally, participants reported feeling 636 
significantly more negative towards the outgroup than the ingroup on the attitude 637 
scale (all ps<.001) (Figure 1). Figure S1 (supplementary information) shows mean 638 
results for each ingroup and outgroup on the dehumanization and attitude 639 
measures.  640 
5.2.2. Intergroup emotion ascription ratings  641 
5.2.2.1. Experiment 2a 642 
For ratings towards Muslims (outgroup) and Christians (ingroup), there were main 643 
effects of humanness, F(1, 129) = 28.75, p <.001, ηp²= .182, and of sociality, F(1, 644 
129) = 147.39, p <.001, ηp²= .533, but not of group, F(1, 129) = .42, p =.517, ηp²= 645 
.003. Ratings were higher overall for emotions shared with other animals than for 646 




 There was a significant interaction between group and sociality, F(1, 129) = 648 
39.45, p <.001, ηp²= .234, but not between group and humanness, F(1, 129) = .75, p 649 
=.389, ηp²= .006, nor between humanness and sociality, F(1, 129) = 1.74, p = .190, 650 
ηp²= .013. Pairwise comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for 651 
ingroup than outgroup for prosocial emotions, but higher for outgroup than ingroup 652 
for antisocial emotions (ps < .001).  653 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction F(1, 129) = 654 
3.97, p =.048, ηp²= .030. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher for 655 
ingroup than outgroup on prosocial terms, both uniquely human and shared with 656 
other animals (ps < .001), and higher for outgroup than ingroup on antisocial terms 657 
(ps < .001), both uniquely human and shared with other animals.  658 
5.2.2.2. Experiment 2b 659 
For ratings towards ‘convicted criminals’ (outgroup) and ‘individuals with no criminal 660 
history’ (ingroup), there were main effects of humanness, F(1, 129) = 40.04, p 661 
<.001, ηp²= .237, and of group, F(1, 129) = 36.63, p < .001, ηp² = .221, but not of 662 
sociality, F(1, 129) < .001, p =.996, ηp²< .001. Ratings were higher overall for 663 
emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely human emotions, and for 664 
ingroup than outgroup.  665 
 There was a significant interaction between group and sociality, F(1, 129) = 666 
201.29, p <.001, ηp²= .609, humanness and sociality, F(1, 129) = 33.63, p <.001, 667 
ηp²= .207, but not between group and humanness, F(1, 129) = .98, p  = .323, ηp²= 668 
.008. Pairwise comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup 669 
than outgroup for prosocial emotions, but higher for outgroup than ingroup for 670 




 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 129) = 672 
24.72, p <.001, ηp²= .161. Planned analyses of simple effects following the three-673 
way interaction showed that ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup on 674 
prosocial terms, both uniquely human and shared with other animals (ps < .001), 675 
and higher for outgroup than ingroup on antisocial terms (ps < .001), both uniquely 676 
human and shared with other animals.  677 
5.2.2.3. Experiment 2c 678 
For ratings towards ‘child molesters’ (outgroup) and ‘individuals with no criminal 679 
history’ (ingroup) on emotion experiences, there were main effects of humanness, 680 
F(1, 129) = 6.81, p = .010, ηp²= .050, and of group, F(1, 129) = 122.42, p < .001, ηp² 681 
= .487, and of sociality, F(1, 129) = 25.01 p <.001, ηp² = .162. Ratings were higher 682 
overall for emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely human emotions, 683 
for ingroup than outgroup, and for antisocial than prosocial emotions.  684 
 There was a significant interaction between group and sociality, F(1, 129) = 685 
201.29, p <.001, ηp²= .609, humanness and sociality, F(1, 129) = 234.42, p <.001, 686 
ηp²= .645, and between group and humanness, F(1, 129) = 21.82, p  < .001, ηp²= 687 
.145. Pairwise comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup 688 
than outgroup for prosocial emotions, but higher for outgroup than ingroup for 689 
antisocial emotions (ps < .001). Though the interaction between group and 690 
humanness was significant, this did not reflect the infrahumanization prediction. 691 
Ratings were overall higher for ingroup than outgroup both for uniquely human 692 
emotions and for emotions shared with other animals. Importantly, ratings were 693 
higher for ingroup than outgroup on prosocial terms, both uniquely human and 694 




antisocial terms, both uniquely human (p. <.001) and shared with other animals (p = 696 
.004). The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 129) = .28, p =.600, ηp²= 697 
.002.  698 
5.2.2.4. Experiment 2d 699 
For ratings towards ‘anti-vaxxers’ (outgroup) and ‘pro-vaxxers’ (ingroup), there was 700 
a significant main effect of humanness, F(1, 129) = 69.28, p < .001, ηp²= .349, but 701 
not of group, F(1, 129) = 2.79, p = .097, ηp² = .021, nor of sociality, F(1, 129) = 1.33, 702 
p =.251, ηp² = .010. Ratings were higher overall for emotions shared with other 703 
animals than for uniquely human emotions.   704 
 There was a significant interaction between group and sociality, F(1, 129) = 705 
216.29, p <.001, ηp²= .626, humanness and sociality, F(1, 129) = 4.55, p =.035, ηp²= 706 
.034, but not between group and humanness, F(1, 129) = .08, p  =.782, ηp²= .001. 707 
Pairwise comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than 708 
outgroup for prosocial emotions, but higher for outgroup than ingroup for antisocial 709 
emotions (ps < .001).  710 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction F(1, 129) = 711 
14.83, p <.001, ηp²= .103. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher for 712 
ingroup than outgroup on prosocial terms, both uniquely human and shared with 713 
other animals and higher for outgroup than ingroup on antisocial terms both uniquely 714 
human and shared with other animals (all ps <.001).  715 
5.2.2.5. Experiment 2e 716 
For ratings towards ‘non-social distancers’ (outgroup) and ‘social distancers’ 717 
(ingroup), there was a significant main effect of humanness, F(1, 129) = 10.32, p = 718 




sociality, F(1, 129) = 1.80, p =.183, ηp² = .014. Ratings were higher overall for 720 
emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely human emotions.   721 
 There was a significant interaction between group and sociality, F(1, 129) = 722 
213.36, p <.001, ηp²= .623, group and humanness, F(1, 129) = 59.99, p <.001, ηp²= 723 
.306, and sociality and humanness, F(1, 129) = 56.59, p  <.001, ηp²= .305. Pairwise 724 
comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup for 725 
prosocial emotions, but higher for outgroup than ingroup for antisocial emotions (ps 726 
< .001). Ratings were also higher for outgroup than ingroup for uniquely human 727 
emotions, but higher for ingroup than outgroup on emotions shared with other 728 
animals (ps < .001).  729 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction F(1, 129) = 730 
37.90, p <.001, ηp²= .227. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher for 731 
ingroup than outgroup on prosocial terms, both uniquely human and shared with 732 
other animals and higher for outgroup than ingroup on antisocial terms both uniquely 733 
human and shared with other animals (all ps <.001).  734 
5.2.2.6.Experiment 2f 735 
For ‘climate change deniers’ (outgroup) and ‘climate change believers’ (ingroup), 736 
there was a significant main effect of humanness, F(1, 129) = 102.37, p < .001, ηp²= 737 
.442, of group, F(1, 129) = 6.32, p = .013, ηp² = .047, and a marginal effect of 738 
sociality, F(1, 129) = 3.85, p =.052, ηp² = .029. Ratings were higher overall for 739 
emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely human emotions, for ingroup 740 
than outgroup, and for antisocial than prosocial emotions.  741 
 There was a significant interaction between group and sociality, F(1, 129) = 742 




.396, and sociality and humanness, F(1, 129) = 9.37, p  =.003, ηp²= .068. Pairwise 744 
comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup for 745 
prosocial emotions, but higher for outgroup than ingroup for antisocial emotions (ps 746 
< .001). Ratings were also higher for outgroup than ingroup for uniquely human 747 
emotions, but higher for ingroup than outgroup on emotions shared with other 748 
animals (ps < .001).  749 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction F(1, 129) = 750 
14.04, p <.001, ηp²= .098. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher for 751 
ingroup than outgroup on prosocial terms, both uniquely human (p = .001) and 752 
shared with other animals (p < .001), and higher for outgroup than ingroup on 753 
uniquely human antisocial terms (p < .001). However, there was no difference 754 
between ingroup and outgroup on antisocial terms shared with other animals (p = 755 
.200).     756 
 Mean scores (M) and standard errors of the mean (SE) for each of the 757 
conditions across all experiments in Study 2 are shown in supplementary 758 
information, Table S3. Figure 3 shows results for Study 2. 759 
Figure 3.  Evidence for social preferences but not infrahumanization. Contrary to 




prosocial emotions but higher for the outgroup than the ingroup for antisocial emotions 
across all group contexts. Note that while main effects of valence have been reported in 
some prior work (see Leyens et al., 2001, p. 402, Fig. 2), we do not plot these in our 
predictions, as they are not relevant for distinguishing between the theories. Error bars 
represent standard errors.  
5.3. Study 2 Discussion 760 
Contrary to infrahumanization theory, outgroups were not denied uniquely human 761 
emotions relative to ingroups. All outgroups were thought to experience prosocial 762 
emotions to a lesser extent than ingroups, both for uniquely human emotions and for 763 
those shared with other animals. However, all outgroups were also thought to 764 
experience uniquely human antisocial emotions to a greater extent than ingroup 765 
members. Muslims, criminals, child molesters, anti-vaxxers and non-social 766 
distancers were rated as experiencing antisocial emotions shared with other animals 767 
to a greater extent than the ingroup. However, there was no difference between 768 
climate change deniers and the ingroup for this condition. This may be because in 769 
this context, it is reasonable to suppose believers in climate change experience 770 
substantial levels of emotions such as anger and irritation. This highlights the 771 
importance of social context and stereotyping as well as ingroup preferences in 772 
explaining emotion attribution. Study 3 employed a minimal groups design in order 773 
to measure similar effects in the absence of learned stereotypes and historical 774 
negative feeling.   775 
 776 




In our final experiment, we aim to replicate findings from Study 2 within a minimal 778 
groups design. Though we chose our six outgroup exemplars for Studies 1 and 2 to 779 
maximise our chances of detecting infrahumanization should it occur (based on past 780 
empirical work and also following suggestions from Leyens, 2009), it remains 781 
possible that learned stereotypes and intergroup antagonism may have weighted 782 
responses towards reflecting social preferences as opposed to subtle 783 
dehumanization. By using a minimal groups design, we were able to ensure we 784 
tested between the two competing hypotheses in the absence of these additional 785 
factors. Prior work has reported infrahumanization effects in minimal groups 786 
(Demoulin et al., 2009; Simon & Gutsell, 2020), meaning this approach was 787 
methodologically appropriate for comparing the two theories.  788 
 Participants were first allocated to novel groups using a dot estimation task 789 
(Diehl, 1990; Ratner & Amodio, 2013; Tajfel, 1970). Then, participants rated the 790 
novel ingroup and novel outgroup on emotional experiences as described for Study 791 
2. The study design and predictions were identical as for Study 2. Infrahumanization 792 
would be observed in an interaction between group and humanness such that 793 
uniquely human emotions are more strongly ascribed to ingroup than outgroup, both 794 
for prosocial and antisocial emotions. However, we again hypothesised that 795 
prosocial human emotions would typically be attributed more strongly to the ingroup 796 
and antisocial ones to the outgroup.  797 
6.1. Study 3 Methods  798 
6.1.1. Participants  799 
Based on the same power analysis as reported for Studies 1 and 2, 130 different 800 




take part if they were over 18, fluent in English, and had not taken part in any of the 802 
other experiments reported presently. Nine people failed one or more attention 803 
check and their data was excluded and replaced. Of the final sample, 56 804 
participants were female and 74 were male, aged from 18 to 57 (Mean age = 26.8, 805 
SD = 9.10).  806 
6.1.2. Minimal group paradigm  807 
Participants were assigned to novel groups based on a classic dot estimation task 808 
(e.g., Diehl, 1990; Ratner & Amodio, 2013; Tajfel, 1970). Participants were told that 809 
the purpose of the study was to help us understand the ways in which people 810 
ascribe emotions to different groups of individuals and that they would first perform 811 
a simple numerical estimation task to identify which group (out of two) they belonged 812 
to. Instead of the common categories of ‘over-estimators’ and ‘under-estimators’, we 813 
used the terms ‘spatial-estimators’ and ‘object-estimators’. This was because the 814 
emotion attribution task relied on a form of estimation (of emotional experience) and 815 
we wanted to ensure the group labels did not interact with later emotion judgments. 816 
Before the task, participants were told that people can be categorised as taking an 817 
object approach to estimation ('object-estimators') or a spatial approach to 818 
estimation ('spatial-estimators') and that individual tendencies for the two styles are 819 
equally distributed in the population. 820 
 In the dot estimation task, participants saw eleven images of random patterns 821 
of dots each on the screen for 1 second. After each image, participants had to enter 822 
the number of dots they believed they had seen before the next image appeared. 823 
The task and stimuli were based on an Inquisit script from Millisecond 824 




 Following the task, half of the participants were told they had been classified 826 
as a spatial-estimator and the other half were told they had been classified as an 827 
object-estimator. This procedure met the key criteria for a minimal group paradigm 828 
(Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971).  829 
6.1.3. Stimuli, Scales, Procedure, Design and data analysis  830 
The emotion stimuli, scale presentation, procedure, design and planned data 831 
analysis were all exactly the same as outlined for Study 2.  832 
6.2. Study 3 Results  833 
6.2.1. Blatant dehumanization and attitude scores  834 
The novel outgroup was rated as significantly less human than the novel ingroup on 835 
the blatant dehumanization scale (p=.002) (Figure 1). However the novel outgroup 836 
was still rated closest to the silhouette reminiscent of a modern human on the scale, 837 
and was not ‘blatantly dehumanized’ to the extent that outgroups in Studies 1 and 2 838 
were. Participants reported feeling significantly more negative towards the novel 839 
outgroup than the novel ingroup on the attitude scale (p<.001). Figure S1 840 
(supplementary information) shows mean results for the ingroup and outgroup on 841 
the blatant dehumanization and group preference measures.  842 
6.2.2. Intergroup emotion ascription ratings  843 
For ratings towards novel ingroup and outgroup members (minimal group design), 844 
there were main effects of group, F(1, 129) = 7.58, p =.007, ηp²= .055, of 845 
humanness, F(1, 129) = 32.93, p <.001, ηp²= .203, and of sociality, F(1, 129) = 846 
99.74, p <.001, ηp²= .436. Ratings were higher overall for ingroup than outgroup, for 847 
emotions shared with other animals than for uniquely human emotions, and for 848 




 There was a significant interaction between group and sociality, F(1, 129) = 850 
22.45, p <.001, ηp²= .148, but not between group and humanness, F(1, 129) = 1.84, 851 
p =.177, ηp²= .014, nor between humanness and sociality, F(1, 129) = .15, p = .704, 852 
ηp²= .001. Pairwise comparisons showed that overall, ratings were higher for 853 
ingroup than outgroup for prosocial emotions (p<.001), but higher for outgroup than 854 
ingroup for antisocial emotions (p = .007).  855 
 All effects were qualified in a significant three-way interaction F(1, 129) = 856 
13.25, p < .001, ηp²= .093. Planned comparisons showed that ratings were higher 857 
for ingroup than outgroup on prosocial terms, both uniquely human and shared with 858 
other animals (ps < .001). Ratings were higher for outgroup than ingroup on 859 
uniquely human antisocial terms (p < .001), but for antisocial terms shared with 860 
other animals there was no difference between ingroup and outgroup (p = .637). 861 
 Mean scores (M) and standard errors of the mean (SE) for each of the 862 
conditions in Study 3 are shown in, supplementary information, Table S4. Figure 4 863 
shows results for Study 3. 864 
 865 
Figure 4.  Evidence for social preference but not infrahumanization in a 866 




social preference account ratings were higher for the ingroup than the outgroup for 868 
prosocial uniquely human emotions but higher for the outgroup than the ingroup for 869 
antisocial uniquely human emotions. Error bars represent standard errors. 870 
6.3. Study 3 Discussion 871 
Contrary to the predictions of infrahumanization theory novel outgroup members 872 
were not denied uniquely human emotions relative to novel ingroup members. There 873 
was no significant interaction between group and humanness but there was an 874 
interaction between group and sociality. Outgroup members were thought to 875 
experience prosocial uniquely human emotions to a lesser extent than ingroup 876 
members, but antisocial uniquely human emotions to a greater extent than ingroup 877 
members. This finding shows that even in a novel group context free from learned 878 
stereotypes and antagonism, our social preference account better explains 879 
intergroup biases in emotion attribution than infrahumanization theory.  880 
 881 
7. General discussion 882 
We found no convincing evidence for infrahumanization. In our first set of studies we 883 
broadly replicated previously reported  effects (Study 1) showing our paradigm was 884 
well placed to detect infrahumanization if it occurs.  Our subsequent results suggest 885 
that, in the seven intergroup contexts we employed, what appeared to be evidence 886 
for infrahumanization can be better explained by social preference (Study 2). When 887 
emotion terms varied on sociality rather than on valence, people did not ‘subtly 888 
dehumanize’ the outgroups we included by denying them uniquely human emotions. 889 
Rather, they attributed prosocial emotions more strongly to ingroup members and 890 




This accords with recent critiques of the social psychological literature on 892 
dehumanization more generally (Bloom, 2017; Lang, 2010, 2020; Manne, 2016, 893 
2018; Over, 2020a, 2020b; Smith, 2014, 2016) and offers an important conceptual 894 
development to our understanding of intergroup bias in emotion judgements.  895 
 In practical terms, more accurately characterising the ways in which the 896 
emotions of different groups are perceived has important implications for real world 897 
settings such as criminal justice, in which certain defendants, for example those 898 
perceived as belonging to a religious outgroup, might be unfairly viewed as 899 
possessing lower levels of remorse but also higher levels of contempt as a result of 900 
their group membership. One of the main reasons why infrahumanization theory has 901 
been influential in intergroup relations research is because it has been causally 902 
linked to negative behavioural consequences. For example, previous research has 903 
suggested that infrahumanizing outgroups reduces prosocial behaviour towards 904 
them (Cuddy et al., 2007; Vaes et al., 2002, 2003). In light of the present findings, 905 
future research would benefit from revisiting previously-reported links between 906 
biases in emotion attribution and prosocial and antisocial behaviours.  907 
 Our results dovetail with recent empirical work that challenges the predictions 908 
made by Haslam’s (2006) dual model of dehumanization (Enock et al., 2021). This 909 
research showed that when undesirable human-specific characteristics (such as 910 
‘corrupt’ and ‘selfish’) are included in overall measures of humanness, there is no 911 
evidence for either animalistic or mechanistic dehumanization of outgroups as 912 
characterised by the dual model. Rather, desirable human qualities are more 913 
strongly attributed to ingroup members and undesirable human qualities to outgroup 914 




importance of considering sociality confounds when measuring psychological 916 
processes of ‘dehumanization’, this time through another highly prominent 917 
framework within the field.  918 
During the review process, it was put to us that because dimensions of 919 
valence and sociality correlate highly in our pretest, the two constructs are 920 
“indistinguishable”, thus rendering our critique obsolete. We believe this represents 921 
a misunderstanding. Height and weight are strongly positively correlated, yet they 922 
are distinct constructs. Similarly, even though emotions that are generally perceived 923 
as prosocial may also perceived as positive to experience, and emotions that are 924 
generally perceived as antisocial may also be perceived as negative to experience, 925 
the two constructs are clearly conceptually distinct. While sadness is negative to 926 
experience, it is not inherently antisocial in character.  Schadenfreude on the other 927 
hand is, by definition, positive to experience but antisocial in character. Many 928 
research findings converge on the view that while ‘regret’ or ‘remorse’ are negative 929 
to feel they are not unkind in character (Stearns & Parrott, 2012, see also Parkinson, 930 
1996; Vaish & Hepach, 2020; van Kleef et al., 2016). Our argument is that the kinds 931 
of negative emotions that proponents of infrahumanization theory have included in 932 
previous research, such as disillusion, regret, melancholy and remorse (e.g., Banton 933 
et al., 2020; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes et al., 2003) are 934 
negative to experience but are not antisocial and so are not best placed to 935 
determine whether infrahumanization is separate from intergroup preference.  936 
While our results offer an important and novel empirical critique of prior work 937 
on infrahumanization, we acknowledge that we only tested seven intergroup 938 




animosity (criminals and child molesters) and some containing little or no prior 940 
animosity (minimal groups). Despite this, without testing many more groups (such 941 
as those based on nationality, race or gender), it remains a possibility that 942 
infrahumanization could sometimes occur even when sociality of emotion is 943 
controlled. However, participants explicitly dehumanized all seven outgroups relative 944 
to the ingroup on the blatant dehumanization scale, suggesting we would likely 945 
observe infrahumanization if it occurs (Kteily et al., 2015). Further, the groups we 946 
chose exemplify the criteria for infrahumanization proposed in prior work (Leyens, 947 
2009).  948 
Our results demonstrate both ingroup favouritism (assigning greater prosocial 949 
feeling to the ingroup) and outgroup derogation (assigning greater antisocial feeling 950 
to the outgroup) (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002). However, we also note that 951 
group specific stereotypes and particular social contexts are likely to play an 952 
important role in these processes (Fiske et al., 2002). For example, it is likely that 953 
group status may affect the specific emotions that are ascribed to group members. 954 
Emotions such as ‘contempt’ and ‘schadenfreude’ are included as exemplars of 955 
antisocial uniquely human emptions in the present work, but it may not be the case 956 
that outgroup members perceived as ‘lower status’ such as homeless people would 957 
be attributed these antisocial emotions to a greater extent than the ingroup because 958 
these particular emotions imply a position of status. There may be other uniquely 959 
human yet antisocial emotions that a ‘lower status’ outgroup may be more likely to 960 
be perceived as experiencing, such as bitterness or envy. Similarly, it is possible 961 
that groups such as ‘immigrants’ could be perceived as feeling high levels of 962 




to explore the many nuances of emotion attribution in intergroup contexts but rather 964 
more modest in scope, we aimed to show that apparent evidence for 965 
infrahumanization may be better explained by other factors. Future work would 966 
benefit from more closely examining the role of stereotypes and specific social 967 
contexts as well as preference effects in explaining intergroup bias in emotion 968 
attribution.  969 
We also acknowledge that we only employed explicit measures whereas 970 
infrahumanization theory has also gained support from implicit measures (Boccato 971 
et al., 2007; Paladino et al., 2002). We chose to do this because explicit measures 972 
have provided considerably stronger evidence for infrahumanization than have 973 
implicit measures. Results from implicit measures showing stronger associations 974 
between certain groups and particular emotion terms are inherently ambiguous. It is 975 
not clear whether automatic associations reflect estimates of the emotions the group 976 
experiences, or whether they reflect participants’ own emotional reaction. For 977 
example, would an implicit association between ‘anger’ and ‘immigrants’ reflect a 978 
belief that immigrants feel anger, or automatic anger towards immigrants? The 979 
former could support infrahumanization theory but there is no way to rule out the 980 
latter. Nevertheless, the field would benefit from careful empirical research 981 
rigorously controlling for emotion sociality in more implicit contexts. Additionally, we 982 
acknowledge that, following the majority of prior work on infrahumanization, we 983 
conceptualised humanness and valence/sociality dichotomously and as such tested 984 
our predictions with relatively few exemplars from each category. Though this 985 




hypotheses but treating humanness and sociality as continuous predictors (see 987 
Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006).  988 
 These possibilities do not detract from the central importance of our critique. 989 
More generally, our results illustrate the importance of considering the sociality of 990 
emotion terms employed as stimuli, a methodological advancement that will be 991 
crucial to incorporate in any future studies of emotion attribution in other intergroup 992 
contexts. To accurately test for ‘infrahumanization’, future research must consider 993 
the central role of emotion sociality as separate from emotional experience. Prior 994 
work has reported infrahumanization to be extremely widespread in society and 995 
prevalent across a multitude of intergroup divides (Banton et al., 2020; Cortes et al., 996 
2005; Cuddy et al., 2007; Gaunt, 2009; Leyens et al., 2000, 2001; Rodríguez-Pérez 997 
et al., 2011; Simon & Gutsell, 2020; Vaes et al., 2002, 2003). Rigorous 998 
measurement, tighter experimental control and more careful consideration of social 999 
context may change some or all of the conclusions from previous research.    1000 
  If psychological research is to effectively inform intervention to improve 1001 
intergroup relations, it is essential it accurately characterises the underlying 1002 
mechanisms of intergroup bias. Our findings suggest the construct of 1003 
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 1179 
Supplementary information on pretest scales  1180 
To determine the extent to which emotions are considered to be uniquely human or 1181 
shared with other species, positive or negative to experience, and prosocial or 1182 
antisocial in character, participants rated fifty-four emotion words on three scales.   1183 
 The words we included were: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 1184 
surprise (these first six are often considered primary emotions), admiration, 1185 
arrogance, bitterness, compassion, complacency, conceit, contempt, contentment, 1186 
disappointment, disillusion, embarrassment, empathy, envy, friendliness, gloating, 1187 
greed, grief, guilt, hatred, hope, hopelessness, hostility, humiliation, humility, 1188 
irritation, jealousy, loneliness, love, melancholy, nervousness, nostalgia, optimism, 1189 
patience, pride, regret, relief, remorse, resentment, resignation, schadenfreude, 1190 
scorn, self-satisfaction, shame, shyness, smugness, spite, tenderness, 1191 
vengefulness. These terms were obtained from prior work on infrahumanization and 1192 
from emotion research more generally (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2001). 1193 
 The Humanness scale asked: “Using the slider, please indicate how much 1194 
the emotion in each of the following questions is experienced by humans compared 1195 
to other species (i.e., is this emotion unique to humans?)” The bottom end of the 1196 
slider, 0, corresponded to Just other species and the top end, 100, corresponded to 1197 
Just humans, with the midpoint, 50, indicating Equal to humans and other species.  1198 
The Valence scale asked:  “Using the slider, please indicate what you think 1199 
this emotion is like to experience (i.e., how does it make you feel?).” The bottom end 1200 




corresponded to Extremely positive, with the midpoint, 50, indicating Neutral to 1202 
experience.  1203 
The Sociality scale asked: “Using the slider, please indicate what you think 1204 
someone who regularly experiences this emotion is like (i.e., how kind are they likely 1205 
to be?).” The bottom end of the slider, 0, corresponded to Extremely unkind and the 1206 
top end, 100, corresponded to Extremely kind, with the midpoint, 50, indicating 1207 
Neither kind nor unkind. 1208 
Taking our lead from infrahumanization theory, we were interested in lay 1209 
conceptions of emotions. As prosociality is not a common word for the general 1210 
population, we use ‘kindness’ in our scale to capture ‘what you think someone who 1211 
regularly experiences this emotion is like’ as opposed to ‘what you think this emotion 1212 
is like to experience’. We use the term ‘sociality’ throughout to clearly distinguish 1213 
from ‘valence’ as subjective experience. 1214 
Each item was scored from 0-100 but participants could not see the numbers. 1215 
The three scales were presented in separate blocks on sequential screens and the 1216 
order of completion was counterbalanced such that one third of participants rated 1217 
Humanness then Valence then Sociality, one third rated Sociality then Humanness 1218 
then Valence, and one third rated Valence then Sociality then Humanness. The 1219 
emotion items within each block were randomised. One attention check per block 1220 
was included approximately halfway through, such as ‘Please indicate extremely 1221 
positive’. Participants were excluded and their data replaced if they failed one or 1222 






Supplementary results for pretest  1226 
The mean ratings for each emotion on Humanness, Valence and Sociality are 1227 
presented in Table S1.  We show ratings from most to least uniquely human, most 1228 
to least positive to experience and most to least prosocial. On the humanness scale, 1229 
we were most interested in finding emotions perceived as shared with other species 1230 
(scoring close to 50) and those perceived as being only experienced by humans 1231 
(scoring close to 100). While some emotions were rated similarly on sociality and 1232 
valence (compassion was rated as highly positive to experience and highly 1233 
prosocial), others were rated orthogonally (grief was rated as highly negative to 1234 
experience but neither prosocial nor antisocial).  1235 
Table S1. Pretest results 1236 
Humanness  Valence Sociality 
Most to least human Most to least positive Most to least prosocial 
Emotion M SE Emotion M SE Emotion M SE 
Nostalgia  85.1 2.43 Happiness  95.5 1.04 Compassion 86.4 1.95 
Arrogance  79.9 2.61 Love 91.7 1.72 Empathy 86.3 1.71 
Optimism  79.8 2.70 Friendliness  85.0 2.12 Love  84.6 2.06 
Schadenfreude  79.3 2.86 Optimism  84.6 1.67 Friendliness 82.9 2.48 
Disillusion 79.2 2.39 Hope  81.0 2.05 Happiness 80.1 2.34 
Humility  78.6 2.46 Compassion  80.9 2.04 Patience 75.5 2.10 
Contempt  76.9 2.48 Empathy 79.1 2.09 Optimism 74.7 2.16 
Regret 76.7 2.71 Relief  78.7 2.57 Tenderness  74.7 2.74 
Melancholy  76.5 2.69 Self-satisfaction 78.6 2.68 Hope 71.1 1.92 
Scorn  76.1 2.74 Tenderness  77.0 2.47 Admiration  70.4 2.08 
Smugness 75.9 2.55 Admiration  76.9 1.86 Contentment 68.1 2.24 
Humiliation  75.8 2.80 Patience  72.9 2.25 Humility  67.5 2.90 
Remorse  75.6 2.41 Contentment 72.8 3.20 Relief  66.0 1.98 
Embarrassment 75.1 2.53 Pride  69.8 2.69 Nostalgia 64.6 2.07 
Hope  74.6 2.80 Surprise  65.4 1.86 Shyness 59.4 1.90 
Greed 74.6 2.68 Humility  62.8 3.63 Surprise 58.6 1.50 
Hopelessness  74.3 2.76 Nostalgia  60.8 2.93 Self-satisfaction  58.3 2.60 
Conceit  74.3 2.65 Complacency 55.1 3.15 Complacency  53.4 2.51 
Bitterness 74.1 2.31 Gloating  44.9 3.43 Guilt 53.0 2.34 
Vengefulness  72.3 2.74 Smugness  43.6 3.55 Remorse  52.5 2.90 
Resentment  71.5 2.82 Shyness  40.4 1.82 Regret  52.5 2.38 




Hate  71.1 2.62 Schadenfreude 35.6 3.14 Nervousness 49.5 1.87 
Guilt  70.5 2.83 Melancholy  34.8 2.63 Embarrassment 49.0 1.89 
Complacency  70.4 2.64 Remorse  33.5 2.93 Shame  48.3 2.28 
Spite  70.3 2.87 Nervousness 31.8 2.00 Grief 48.1 2.44 
Shame 70.2 2.76 Contempt  31.1 2.99 Melancholy 47.6 2.30 
Self-satisfaction 70.1 2.66 Resignation 26.8 2.13 Sadness  46.4 2.49 
Disappointment  69.1 2.27 Disillusion 25.5 2.43 Fear  46.2 1.71 
Envy  68.6 2.65 Guilt  24.9 2.12 Loneliness  45.6 2.29 
Pride 68.5 2.69 Irritation 24.3 1.76 Resignation 43.8 1.81 
Disgust  67.9 2.84 Arrogance  24.2 2.79 Hopelessness  42.4 2.26 
Resignation 67.2 2.59 Embarrassment 23.4 2.10 Disillusion  40.7 2.14 
Admiration  66.7 2.57 Regret  23.4 2.12 Disappointment 40.3 2.44 
Shyness  66.4 2.40 Fear  23.3 2.28 Gloating  39.0 3.54 
Relief  65.0 2.49 Spite 23.3 2.69 Smugness  35.4 3.13 
Compassion  64.9 2.40 Envy 23.0 1.94 Contempt  33.8 2.65 
Jealousy  64.7 2.50 Scorn  22.1 2.22 Humiliation  33.7 2.80 
Patience  64.5 2.48 Resentment  21.9 1.70 Conceit  32.6 2.66 
Empathy  63.4 2.87 Greed 21.6 2.39 Resentment  31.1 2.06 
Contentment 62.6 2.25 Vengefulness 21.3 2.42 Irritation 29.1 2.16 
Nervous 60.2 2.32 Hostility  21.3 2.89 Bitterness 28.2 2.00 
Friendliness  58.6 2.12 Shame  20.8 1.85 Schadenfreude  28.1 2.89 
Grief  58.5 1.67 Jealousy 19.7 1.98 Envy 27.1 2.04 
Love  58.4 1.95 Disappointment 18.9 1.93 Jealousy 25.6 2.12 
Anger  57.2 2.31 Grief 18.7 2.38 Scorn  25.6 2.43 
Irritation 57.1 2.34 Sadness  18.1 2.42 Disgust 24.5 2.01 
Surprise  56.8 1.76 Bitterness 17.9 1.62 Greed 23.9 2.26 
Tenderness 56.1 1.63 Anger  17.8 1.87 Spite 22.9 2.29 
Happiness 54.7 1.66 Loneliness  15.9 2.13 Anger 22.7 2.36 
Sadness 54.3 1.53 Disgust  15.5 1.80 Hostility 21.6 2.96 
Loneliness  53.8 1.71 Humiliation 12.9 1.75 Arrogance  20.9 1.98 
Hostility  53.6 2.19 Hopelessness  12.5 1.81 Vengefulness 14.2 1.88 
Fear  48.6 1.58 Hate  7.4 1.30 Hate  10.0 1.70 
 1237 
Table S1. Emotion terms scored from highest to lowest along dimensions of Humanness, 1238 
Valence, and Sociality. Mean scores (M) and standard error of the mean (SE) are presented 1239 
alongside each word. Respective to each scale, 100 indicated the emotion was highly 1240 
unique to humans / extremely positive to experience / extremely kind (prosocial). 0 indicated 1241 
the emotion was unique to other species  / extremely negative to experience / extremely 1242 
unkind (antisocial). 50 indicated the emotion applied equally to humans and other species / 1243 





Supplementary information on intergroup contexts (Studies 1 and 2) 1246 
We employed six intergroup contexts across the experiments in Studies 1 and 2. In 1247 
Experiments 1a and 2a, the outgroup was Muslims and the ingroup was Christians. 1248 
In Experiments 1b and 2b, the outgroup was ‘Individuals with criminal convictions’ 1249 
(criminals) and the ingroup was ‘Individuals with no criminal history’. In Experiments 1250 
1c and 2c, the outgroup was ‘Child molesters’ and the ingroup was ‘Individuals with 1251 
no criminal history’. In Experiments 1d and 2d, the outgroup was ‘Individuals who 1252 
are against vaccination (‘anti-vaxxers’)’ and the ingroup was ‘Individuals who are in 1253 
favour of vaccination (‘pro-vaxxers’)’. In Experiments 1e and 2e, the outgroup was 1254 
‘Individuals who do not adhere to the government regulations on social 1255 
distancing/quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (‘non-social distancers’) and 1256 
ingroup was ‘Individuals who do adhere to the government regulations on social 1257 
distancing/quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (‘social distancers’). In 1258 
Experiments 1f and 2f, the outgroup was ‘Individuals who do not believe in climate 1259 
change (‘climate change deniers’)’ and the ingroup was ‘Individuals who believe in 1260 
climate change (‘climate change believers’)’.  1261 
 1262 
Supplementary information for Study 1 1263 
Supplementary information on stimuli development (Study 1) 1264 
We chose emotions from our pretest data that best fit the four emotion categories of 1265 
interest. We chose four rated as highly positive and four rated as highly negative 1266 
from both the most and least uniquely human terms.  1267 
 For conceptual consistency between our stimulus set and the original work 1268 




antisocial. This was because we suggest that the kinds of negative emotions that 1270 
have been included in previous infrahumanization research (e.g., regret, 1271 
melancholy, disillusion, remorse - Banton et al., 2020; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino 1272 
et al., 2002; Vaes et al., 2003) are negative to experience but are not antisocial. To 1273 
first replicate infrahumanization effects, we included uniquely human emotions that 1274 
were similar to ones used in prior work.  1275 
 In developing the items for our emotion categories, we ensured that 1276 
humanness ratings did not significantly differ between the positive and negative 1277 
conditions for each level of humanness so that we could accurately separate 1278 
valence effects from humanness. For example, whilst Grief was rated as less unique 1279 
to humans and also more negative to experience than Nervousness, when we 1280 
included Grief in the stimuli, the set of non-uniquely human positive emotions was 1281 
overall higher in humanness than the non-uniquely human negative emotions. We 1282 
included Nervousness instead so as to ensure the non-uniquely human positive and 1283 
negative emotions were matched on perceived Humanness.  1284 
 In support of our experimental manipulations, paired t-tests showed that 1285 
combined, the uniquely human emotion words were rated as significantly more 1286 
human (M = 78.3 ± 1.71) than emotions shared with other species (M = 55.3 ± .96), 1287 
t(59) = 14.70, p <.001, d = 1.90. Additionally, The positive words (M = 77.3 ± 1.09) 1288 
were rated as significantly more positive than the negative words (M = 25.8 ± 1.37), 1289 
t(59) = 28.89, p <.001, d = 3.73. Humanness scores were comparable for positive 1290 
(M = 79.5 ± 1.80) and negative words (M = 77.0 ± 1.90) unique to humans, t(59) = 1291 
1.75, p =.085, d = 0.23 and for positive (M = 56.5 ± 1.15) and negative (M = 54.2 ± 1292 




Supplementary information on design and data analysis (Study 1) 1294 
For each experiment, there were eight conditions in total in a 2 x 2 x 2 within-1295 
subjects design. Our overall design mirrored original work (Leyens et al., 2001) with 1296 
some minor methodological developments. We measured emotion attribution by 1297 
asking participants to indicate on a sliding scale the extent to which they believed 1298 
each group to experience the emotion items (from not at all to very strongly) rather 1299 
than by asking them to simply choose whether or not particular emotions applied to 1300 
ingroups or outgroups. This was to provide potential for greater distribution in 1301 
responses so that data were likely to be more appropriate for parametric statistics 1302 
than in original studies, where ANOVAs were performed on counts from 0-3 in each 1303 
condition.  1304 
 We employed a within-subjects design, only including one side of each 1305 
intergroup context, omitting ‘group membership’ as an additional between-subjects 1306 
factor. Previous work found infrahumanization on both sides of group memberships 1307 
and showed effects do not rest on group status (Rodríguez-Pérez et al., 2011). 1308 
Further, effects have been detected in within- as well as between-subjects designs 1309 
(Cortes et al., 2005). This gave us greater statistical power and the opportunity to 1310 
test intergroup contexts in which it may be more difficult to obtain data from both 1311 
sides.  1312 
 1313 
Supplementary information for Study 2  1314 
Supplementary information on stimuli development (Study 2) 1315 
Similar to Study 1, we chose emotions from our pretest data that best fit the four 1316 




antisocial from both the most and least uniquely human terms. Though disgust was 1318 
rated as somewhat more unique to humans than the other emotions categorised as 1319 
shared with other species, it was included in the set of antisocial emotions shared 1320 
with other species because it is widely considered a primary (or ‘basic’) emotion and 1321 
also because with a mean score of (M = 67.9 ± 2.84), it still fell closer to the ‘equal 1322 
to humans and other species’ than the ‘just humans’ mark. While arrogance, 1323 
friendliness and humility may be considered as either traits or emotions by some 1324 
accounts, they are included because prior work on infrahumanization often includes 1325 
trait terms as well as more traditional emotions (Capozza et al., 2013; Hodson & 1326 
Costello, 2007; Vaes & Paladino, 2010). Thus, infrahumanization effects have 1327 
previously been understood and reported across emotions, traits, and even simple 1328 
category words such as ‘wife’ and ‘pet’ (Viki et al., 2006).   1329 
 Similar to Study 1, we ensured that humanness ratings did not significantly 1330 
differ between the prosocial and antisocial conditions for each level of humanness 1331 
so that we could accurately separate sociality effects from ones of humanness. 1332 
Paired t-tests showed that combined, the uniquely human words were rated 1333 
as significantly more human (M = 78.8 ± 1.72) than the words shared with other 1334 
species (M = 57.8 ± 1.07), t(59) = 13.87, p <.001, d = 1.79, and the prosocial words 1335 
(M = 75.00 ± 1.31) were rated as significantly more prosocial than the antisocial 1336 
words (M = 25.8 ± 1.25), t(59) = 21.61, p <.001, d = 2.79. Humanness scores were 1337 
comparable for prosocial (M = 79.5 ± 1.80) and antisocial (M = 78.0 ± 2.18) words 1338 
unique to humans, t(59) = .73, p =.470, d = 0.09 and for prosocial (M = 56.9 ± 1.26) 1339 
and antisocial (M = 58.9 ± 1.60) words shared with other species, t(59) = 1.04, p 1340 




A paired-samples t-test showed no significant difference in valence between 1342 
the negative uniquely human emotions in Study 1 (mean valence = 29.28, SE = 1343 
1.63) and the antisocial uniquely human emotions in Study 2 (mean valence = 1344 
28.23, SE = 1.74), t(59) = .516, p = .607, d = .07, with a Bayes factor of 6.23 1345 
supporting the null. However, the antisocial uniquely human emotions in Study 2 1346 
(mean sociality = 27.09, SE = 1.50) were significantly more antisocial than the 1347 
negative uniquely human emotions in Study 1 (mean sociality = 48.33, SE = 1.59), 1348 
t(59) = .8.63, p < .001, d = 1.11. Thus, the meaningful difference between the 1349 
uniquely human terms included in Studies 1 and 2 was in the sociality – a factor not 1350 
considered in previous infrahumanization research.  1351 
 1352 
Supplementary Figure S1  1353 
 1354 
 1355 
Figure S1. Blatant dehumanization and preference ratings across all experiments in Studies 1, 2 and 1356 
3. Outgroups are: Muslims (1a&2a), criminals (1b&2b), child molesters (1c&2c), anti-vaxxers 1357 
(1d&2d), non-social distancers (1e&2e), climate change deniers (1f&2f), and minimal outgroups (3). 1358 
We collapse data across Studies 1 and 2 for the first 6 groups, giving a total N of 260 per group 1359 
context for these experiments. Outgroups were rated significantly lower than ingroups on the 1360 




on the blatant dehumanization scale (all ps <.001 in Sudies 1 and 2, p=.002 in Study 3). Error bars 1362 
represent standard errors.  1363 
 1364 
Supplementary Tables - Studies 1, 2 and 3  1365 
Table S2. Mean emotion attribution scores by condition in Study 1  1366 
Emotions unique to humans  Emotions shared with other animals 
Positive  Positive Negative Negative Positive Positive Negative Negative 
Expt. Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
1a 72.6 (1.08) 63.9 (1.34) 56.5 (1.55) 52.1 (1.53) 71.2 (1.11) 62.7 (1.44) 55.4 (1.63) 57.8 (1.59) 
1b 67.2 (1.16) 50.8 (1.28) 57.2 (1.37) 62.3 (1.42) 72.1 (1.26) 50.1 (1.59) 62.1 (1.56) 66.8 (1.40) 
1c 67.9 (1.16) 35.3 (1.36) 56.2 (1.28) 44.1 (1.62) 70.4 (1.19) 37.9 (1.74) 60.2 (1.46) 57.7 (1.78) 
1d 67.0 (1.20) 51.4 (1.61) 43.5 (1.83) 52.7 (1.70) 67.4 (1.18) 56.7 (1.50) 48.1 (1.72) 60.9 (1.66) 
1e 62.0 (1.34) 40.4 (1.37) 47.0 (1.42) 35.3 (1.37) 53.5 (1.44) 40.7 (1.24) 73.2 (1.46) 35.1 (1.67) 
1f 58.5 (1.11) 50.5 (1.26) 60.7 (1.16) 41.3 (1.45) 58.0 (1.22) 52.7 (1.27) 65.9 (1.24) 48.1 (1.72) 
Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.  1367 
 1368 
Table S3. Mean emotion attribution scores by condition in Study 2 1369 
Emotions unique to humans  Emotions shared with other animals 
Prosocial Prosocial Antisocial Antisocial Prosocial Prosocial Antisocial Antisocial 
Expt.  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
2a 71.9 (1.07) 66.0 (1.22) 45.6 (1.50) 53.2 (1.39) 75.8 (1.16) 67.0 (1.47) 48.9 (1.55) 57.8 (1.69) 
2b 69.4 (91.08) 50.6 (1.34) 52.1 (1.22) 62.0 (1.15) 72.3 (1.20) 48.6 (1.51) 54.9 (1.31) 71.7 (1.07) 
2c 64.7 (1.14) 37.3 (1.64) 51.4 (1.30) 61.8 (1.43) 68.9 (1.36) 35.1 (1.74) 56.2 (1.46) 61.4 (1.27) 
2d 66.1 (1.18) 51.2 (1.50) 47.2 (1.52) 64.2 (1.43) 73.5 (1.26) 52.9 (1.73) 51.3 (1.83) 74.7 (1.35) 
2e 62.6 (1.49) 39.8 (1.24) 32.3 (1.37) 63.5 (1.41) 60.4 (1.66) 36.4 (1.31) 48.1 (1.53) 61.7 (1.39) 
2f 58.4 (1.36) 51.2 (1.22) 46.4 (1.45) 63.4 (1.21) 67.2 (1.35) 51.3 (1.48) 64.7 (1.40) 62.2 (1.46) 
Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.  1370 
 1371 
Table S4. Mean emotion attribution scores by condition in Study 3 1372 
Uniquely human emotions  Emotions shared with other animals  
Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Prosocial 63.1 (1.09) 56.0 (1.02) 65.7 (1.07) 60.5 (1.18) 
Antisocial 44.6 (1.20) 50.0 (1.09) 50.1 (1.39) 50.7 (1.21) 
Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.  1373 
 1374 
